The main sensitive point that prevented the conclusion of a new transatlantic agreement on common airspace between the EU and the United States was that the United Kingdom and most other European countries considered the US version of open airspace to be too restrictive. The U.S. Open Skies model denied foreign airlines cabotage rights, i.e. the right to operate fully in the U.S. domestic market without entering into a codeshare agreement with a U.S. airline. It also denied foreign airlines the right to acquire shares in their U.S. counterparts in order to exercise control over board hours. Unlike existing bilateral and multilateral air services agreements, Bermuda Agreement has defined specific routes: on which carriers from each country can fly, with the right to host or derive international traffic (but not coasting rights) at any time along the routes:[2] Bermuda agreements have been replaced in two stages by the open-air agreement between the European Union (25 European countries) and the United States March 30, 2008 and June 24, 2010. which provides for an open-air regime even more liberal than Bermuda I. The Bermuda Plan is the result of the adoption by Great Britain and the United States of the so-called transit agreement, which was drawn up at the Chicago conference and ends first and second freedom, as well as the principles contained in the final act of the Bermuda Conference, in the bilateral agreement signed in Bermuda and in the detailed annex of the latter convention. Code sharing was also possible under the 1991 agreement.

The United States then allowed Continental Airlines to travel to London Heathrow, but the British refusal to support the US position prevented Continental from exercising that authority. Continental, however, has been granted permission by the United Kingdom to enter into a code-sharing agreement with Virgin Atlantic, which has placed Continental`s flight numbers on some Virgin flights to Heathrow and Gatwick, in addition to Virgin`s flight numbers. To trace the general context of old differences and new understanding (also at the risk of oversimplification), it can be said that any international agreement on air transport in force and each proposed plan includes one or more of the following factors: routes, privileges (granted to a nation`s air carrier in the airspace of a second), fares, operating frequency, aircraft capacity and degree of economic control that is recognized to an international authority. The full list of privileges is called the Five Freedoms. The first and second freedoms are transit privileges — to operate non-stop in the airspace of a second nation and to stop for non-trafficking purposes; the third, fourth and fifth are commercial privileges — unloading a first nation`s cargo in the territory for a second, picking up cargo in the second to the first, and picking up or unloading goods in the second nation, which is destined to enter or come from it. 1. During the Board`s approval of the I.A.T.A. Conference Machine, a specified tariff agreement is not approved, within a reasonable time, by either of the parties or an I.A.T.A.

conference.